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1. Introduction 
he sovereign nation of Fiji is located in Oceania, an island group in 
the South Pacific Ocean 2100 kilometers north of New Zealand and 
3000 kilometers northeast of Sydney, Australia.  Fiji in its entirety is 
comprised of 332 islands, 110 of which are inhabited. Evidence suggests 
that Fiji has been inhabited for close to 3500 years, initially by the 
Melanesian people.  First encounters with the Europeans came in 1643, 
when Dutch explorer Abel Tasman explored the Fijian islands of Vanua 
Levu and Taveuni. During the early 19th century, Europeans were the first 
to bring money to Fiji via bartering goods for sandalwood and bêche-de-
mer (sea cucumber). The 19th century expansion of European colonialism 
to encompass most of the world outside of the Americas included Fiji. The 
United Kingdom passed by a first opportunity to annex Fiji in 1852, but did 
so in 1874 in connection with a financial settlement of the king’s debts to 
the Australian-based Polynesia Company.  
The banking industry in Fiji dates back to May 1868, when the Polynesia 
Company was granted a monopoly on banking rights within Fiji by King 
Cakobau in return for paying off debts to a U.S. citizen in Fiji.  Fiji did not 
have an active local banking scene, however, until the establishment of the 
Fiji Banking and Commercial Company five years later. Fiji Banking was 
only local in an operational sense at this time, because the bank was 
headquarteredin Auckland, New Zealand. The bank received its Fijian 
charter on August 19, 1873, and opened the first physical bank office in 
Fiji’s history on December 3, 1873, in the then capital Levuka. Local 
merchants grew dissatisfied with the local bank, so in July 1876, Fiji 
Banking’s directors accepted a takeover offer and the Bank of New Zealand 
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opened in Fiji. By 1901, the Bank of New South Wales had become the 
bankers for the Sydney-based Colonial Sugar Refining Company. The 
company had extensive business in Fiji, where sugar had become the main 
export. The Bank of New South Wales was offered banking business in Fiji 
in 1901, which they accepted. These two banks both issued notes. They 
were joined in 1908 by the non-note-issuing Government Savings Bank 
(which has since been renamed to the National Bank of Fiji). The table 
below shows the other banks that commenced operations during the period 
we are examining. Fiji’s currency was patterned on the British nondecimal 
model, with one pound equal to 20 shillings or 240 pence. 
 
Table 1. Commercial banks in Fiji, by country of incorporation and establishment 
date 
Bank (present name, if different) Head Office Local Establishment 
Fiji Banking and Commercial Company  
    (now Bank of New Zealand) 
New Zealand July 17, 1876 
Bank of New South Wales  
    (now Westpac Banking Corporation) 
Australia August 12, 1901 
National Bank of Fiji Fiji 1908 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Australia April 12, 1951 
Bank of Baroda India July 5, 1961 
Barclays Bank International (now Barclays 
Bank) 
UK 1972 
 
2. Establishment of the Fiji currency board 
The Board of Commissioners of Currency was established on November 
18, 1913 with the establishment of the Government Currency Notes 
Ordinance, although it did not commence operations until approximately a 
year later. The board consisted of three persons, who initially were the 
Colonial Secretary and Receiver General of the Colony plus one other 
person appointed by the Governor. (The financial statements of the 
Commissioners simply list their names, not their positions; I assume but 
am not certain that the third appointee was a Fiji Treasury official.) The 
Commissioners had the legal power to issue notes in exchange for gold 
coin or notes previously issued.  The coin received in exchange for currency 
notes formed the Note Guarantee Fund. A fund was to be held in the 
colony by the Commissioners of the board for meeting the payment of the 
notes. Initially at least two-thirds of its assets had to be held in gold, 
although the British Secretary of State for the Colonies could reduce the 
share to as little as one-half if the Governor of Fiji convinced him that such 
a reduction was safe. The remainder, the so-called “investment portion,” 
could be invested in securities of any part of the British Empire except Fiji 
or in such securities as approved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
Apparently the latter clause was the provision that decades later did allow 
investment in local securities, on the grounds that the Secretary of State 
now approved them. There was also to be a Depreciation Fund equal to 10 
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percent of the value of the investment portion, accumulated at a rate of 1 
percent a year. 
The colonial annual report and the other published sources I consulted 
do not state the rationale for passing the law and establishing the Board of 
Commissioners of Currency, but it seems likely that Fiji was exemplifying a 
common trend in monetary thinking at the time.  The belief had developed 
that note issuance should be carried out by the government, rather than by 
privately owned banks, for two main reasons. The first was that a 
government monopoly could generate revenue for the government. The 
second was that government note issue was considered safer, because 
banks often fail eventually, while governments do not cease to exist even if 
they go bankrupt. 
British coins were the only coins in circulation in Fiji at the time the 
currency board began. It was fairly common for smaller British colonies to 
use British coins if their local unit of account was equal to the pound 
sterling. Fiji’s first local coinage of pennies and shillings was introduced in 
1934 by the Commissioners of Currency, and the coins remained in 
circulation until 1969. The denominations of currency used at this time 
were pennies, halfpennies, sixpences, shillings, and two shillings.  In 1936, 
a one penny coin was minted, and in 1947 Fiji began minting 2-sided 
nickels and three-penny “bits.” These coins were minted until 1967. In 1969, 
Fiji changed to a decimal currency in which Fijian $2 = Fijian £1. The 
currency consisted of 1¢, 2¢, 5¢, 10¢, and 20¢ coins, and $0.50, $1, $2, $5, 
$10, and $20 notes.  The $0.50 and $1 notes were changed to coins shortly 
after. Later, $50 and $100 notes were introduced in 1995 and 2007, 
respectively. The issuance of 1¢ and 2¢ coins ceased in 2008, long after the 
currency board period. Currently Fiji’s currency structure is comprised of 
5¢, 10¢, 20¢, 50¢, $1, and $2 coins, and $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100 notes. 
Later sections describe certain changes in the operating procedures of 
the Commissioners of Currency. 
 
3. The exchange rate changes of the 1930s, 1960s, and 
1970s 
Fiji is among the few currency boards to have altered its exchange rate 
against its anchor currency. It did so more than once. A review of the 
circumstances involved helps explain why the changes occurred. 
When the currency board period started in Fiji, the Fijian pound was 
fixed to the pound sterling at par (Fijian £1 = UK£1).  This exchange rate 
was kept in place from December 4, 1914 to December 17, 1929. The 
Government Currency Notes Ordinance of November 18, 1913 established 
the currency board and provided the currency board’s notes to be 
redeemable in gold coin. But before the board began operations, World 
War I broke out, causing the United Kingdom to suspend the gold standard 
in August 1914.  Banks in Fiji maintained parity between the Fijian pound 
and sterling. It does not appear that the currency board exchanged any 
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notes for gold while the UK was off the gold standard, which lasted until 
May 1925. The pound sterling remained on the gold standard until 
September 19, 1931, when the UK chose to abandon gold rather than 
continue with the deflation arising from the monetary pressures of the 
Great Depression. 
Fiji’s official exchange rate remained at par with sterling from December 
18, 1929 to September 8, 1932, but in practice the exchange rate was a clean 
float parallel to the Australian pound until January 1931, and then parallel 
to the New Zealand pound.  Both currencies were depreciating against the 
pound sterling.  The two commercial banks, the Bank of New Zealand and 
the Bank of New South Wales, managed the exchange rate, and their 
actions were influenced by the currency depreciations in their home 
countries (Knapman 1987: 109-119).  
From September 9, 1932 to November 15, 1932 the exchange rate 
returned to Fijian £1 = UK£1.  The Currency Notes Ordinance of November 
1, 1933, section 6(3), gives the impression that the exchange rate returned to 
parity with the pound sterling.  From November 16, 1932 to December 13, 
1932, the new exchange rate came to be Fijian £1 = £1 sterling. On October 
21, 1932, the British Colonial Office instructed the Board of Currency 
Commissioners to cease the issuance of notes against drafts in pounds 
sterling, which was technically illegal under Fijian law. In response to 
pressure from the British government to end the depreciation of the Fijian 
pound, the Commissioners of Currency announced that henceforth they 
would only issue notes in exchange for 20 percent gold and 80 percent 
pounds sterling, and that from December 1, 1933 they would only issue 
notes in exchange for gold (Board of Currency Commissioners, 
announcement of 15 November 1932, cited in Knapman 1987: 112). It is 
unknown when the exchanging of notes only for gold in Fiji ceased.  
Certainly, the board would have stopped this exchange by 1939 when 
World War II began, because all British colonies adopted exchange control 
measures similar to those of the UK. Most likely, it happened in 1933 with 
the pure sterling exchange standard described below. 
For the short period from December 14, 1932 to March 28, 1933, Fiji 
linked its currency to the New Zealand pound because the British colonial 
officials and Fiji’s Legislative Council feared that the Commissioners of 
Currency were creating a shortage of notes that would hinder the record 
sugar harvest.  These two groups overrode the currency board by 
temporarily linking to New Zealand’s currency, and the exchange rate 
became Fijian £1 = New Zealand £1.  The currency board was allowed to 
issue notes against drafts on New Zealand currency for a temporary period 
of six months (Knapman 1987: 113). On January 20, 1933, the New Zealand 
pound was devalued from New Zealand £1.11 = UK£1 to New Zealand 
£1.25 = £1 sterling, making the New Zealand pound again equal to the 
Australian pound. The Fijian pound followed.  
Starting in March 29, 1933 and continuing until November 27, 1967, the 
exchange rate in Fiji was Fijian £1.11 = £1 sterling.  On instructions from the 
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British Colonial Office, Fiji adopted the pound sterling as the anchor 
currency, at the cross rate with the New Zealand pound in effect before 
January 20, 1933. The reason for adopting the pound sterling rather than 
the New Zealand pound was a desire by influential interests in Fiji to avoid 
the risk of further devaluations of the New Zealand pound against the 
pound sterling. The currency board was allowed to issue notes against 
drafts on pounds sterling. 
In the second half of 1957 the Commissioners of Currency began to hold 
a modest amount of local securities in an account called the Fiji 
Development Loan. A number of other British colonial currency boards 
also began similar practices in the late 1950s owing to a relaxation by the 
British Treasury, which had the final say in colonial currency matters about 
local securities. Previously the Fijian commissioners had only held local 
assets in the form of temporary balances with the colonial Treasurer or 
Accountant-General when moving assets back and forth to London in 
response to demands for conversion. Another significant change occurred 
in late 1972, when the currency board began to accept deposits from 
commercial banks. The legal framework of the currency board was 
sufficiently elastic that apparently no new laws had to be passed to 
accommodate these changes. 
Under the post-World War II Bretton Woods international monetary 
system, the pound sterling had pegged exchange rates with the U.S. dollar 
and gold. Through the link of the Fijian pound to the pound sterling, Fiji 
was also indirectly a part of the Bretton Woods system. For the 14-month 
span from November 28, 1967 to January 12, 1969, Fiji’s currency was 
revalued against the pound sterling following the pound sterling’s 
devaluation against gold and the U.S. dollar on November 18, 1967 (Fiji 
Annual Report 1967: 25). The new exchange rate was Fijian £1.045 = £1 
sterling. 
Fiji introduced a decimalized currency on January 13, 1969 at Fiji $2 = 
Fijian £1 (Fiji Annual Report 1970: 28). Fiji was one of several British 
colonies or former colonies to switch its unit of account from a local pound 
to a local decimalized dollar in the 1960s and early 1970s. Australia had 
done so in 1966 and New Zealand in 1967.  An exchange rate of Fiji $1 = 
US$1.4832 was agreed between the United Kingdom and the IMF, because 
the U.S. dollar was the currency in terms of which IMF member countries 
denominated their exchange rates, but after becoming independent on 
October 10, 1970 and joining the IMF on its own on May 28, 1971, Fiji had 
not registered a par value with the IMF before the Bretton Woods system 
began to break apart. Gold convertibility for all countries ended in practice 
when the United States abandoned the gold standard on August 15, 1971. 
Foreign-exchange transactions were suspended in Fiji on June 23, 1972, 
when the United Kingdom floated the pound sterling, and resumed on 
June 26, 1972 (IMF 1973: 168). On October 25, 1972, Fiji revalued against the 
pound sterling to offset the decline of the pound sterling against the U.S. 
dollar at the time, and the exchange rate was Fijian $1.98 = £1 sterling until 
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June 30, 1973 (IMF 1973: 169).  The old exchange rate had been Fijian $2.22 = 
£1 sterling. 
 
4. Was the Fijian board of commissioners of currency 
orthodox? 
To determine whether the Board of Commissioners of Currency acted as 
an orthodox currency board, we must first determine what an orthodox 
currency board is. There are three major characteristics that make a 
currency board orthodox. First, there must be a fixed exchange rate with an 
anchor currency. Second, there must be full convertibility into and out of 
the anchor currency. Third, and finally, net foreign reserves should be 100 
percent or slightly more of the monetary base, at least at the margin. The 
three characteristics taken together imply that the currency board does not 
partake in discretionary monetary policy (Hanke 2008: 56). 
We have already seen that the Fijian pound switched anchor currencies 
in the 1930s and had periods when it required payment for notes in gold 
rather than only in pounds sterling. During those times the currency board 
was not fully orthodox.  
To see whether Fiji’s Board of Commissioners of Currency was an 
orthodox currency board at other times, we performsix tests. The first test is 
that net foreign reserves should be between 100-110 percent of the 
monetary base.  The second test is that domestic assets should be 0 percent 
(or close to 0 percent) of total assets.  The third test is that reserve pass-
through (change in monetary base divided by change in net foreign assets) 
should typically be between 80-120 percent, andthe closer to 100 
percentthis number is the more orthodox the currency board is. The 
remaining tests attempt to adjust for possible noise in the third test. The 
fourth test calculates absolute changes in monetary base and net foreign 
assets. The fifth test examines the change in monetary base and net foreign 
assets as a percentage of the previous year’s monetary base. The sixth and 
last test looks into the level of monetary base and net foreign assets (Hanke, 
2008: 56, Schuler, 2005: 234).  
 
4.1. Foreign assets as a percentage of monetary base 
Our first test to determine orthodoxy was to see if net foreign assets 
were between 100 and 110 percent of the monetary base in Fiji, the range 
characteristic of an orthodox currency board. Net foreign assets are gross 
foreign assets minus foreign liabilities. A corollary is that an orthodox 
currency board will also holdfew or no domestic assets, even on a gross 
basis. A small amount of local financial assets may be held for making local 
payments such as staff salaries, and the currency board may own its 
building, but that is all. The more domestic assets are held as backing for 
the monetary base, the greater the chance that the assets will lose value if 
the domestic economy falters, because of the low liquidity of markets for 
domestic assets in a small economy such as Fiji. Also, foreign assets are not 
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as highly correlated as domestic assets with downturns in the domestic 
economy, providing further insurance against the loss of confidence that 
could create a currency run when the domestic economy falters. 
 
 
Figure 1. Foreign assets as a percentage of monetary base 
 
Figure 1 shows the foreign assets as a percentage of monetary base in Fiji 
during the currency board period, using data from 1918 to 1973. (Earlier 
data was incomplete.) Our ideal percentage to show perfect orthodoxy 
would be 100 percent, or close to it, however anything over 100 percent 
should exemplify orthodoxy of some sort. The average percentage of 
foreign assets divided by monetary base over the 55-year period of the 
Fijian currency board was 99.69 percent, nearly perfect orthodoxy. The ratio 
substantially rose above 110 percent only at two points. In the early 1930s, 
the devaluation of the pound sterling against gold raised the value of the 
currency board’s gold reserves in terms of sterling-linked currencies, and 
then the devaluation of the Fijian pound raised the value of the board’s 
foreign reserves in Fijian pounds. In 1953 the ratio spiked but it is unclear 
why. From 1958 onward the board held significant amounts of domestic 
assets because of changes to policy discussed above. Only in 1968 and 1969 
did the ratio of foreign assets to the monetary base fall below 80 percent.  
Overall, then, the currency board was orthodox before 1958 and only 
moderately unorthodox afterwards.  
Figure 2 below shows the domestic assets as a percentage of the 
monetary base in Fiji during the Board of Commissioners of Currency 
period, again using data from 1918 to 1973. An orthodox currency board 
backs the monetary base entirely by foreign assets and holds nearly zero 
domestic assets.  Since Fiji’s foreign assets were roughly 100 percent of the 
monetary base for most of the currency board period, we would assume 
domestic assets as a percentage of monetary base would be low.  Figure 2 
shows just this for most of the board’s life.   
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The average percentage of domestic assets divided by monetary base 
over the 55-year period of the Fijian currency board was just 7.5 percent.  
This again indicates orthodoxy. There is a blip in the 1960s. In the 1950s 
and 1960s the British government loosened the rules for many colonial 
currency boards and allowed them to hold some domestic assets. In Fiji’s 
case we see that after peaking above 33 percent of monetary base in 1967, 
and consistently being above 20 percent from 1963 to 1971 apart from one 
year, domestic assets dove back to low single-digit levels after this.  Note 
that foreign assets plus domestic assets exceeded 100 percent of the 
monetary base rather than adding up to 100 percent, so that, for example, 
when domestic assets were equal to 33 percent of the monetary base in 
1967, net foreign reserves were 82.0 percent of the monetary base rather 
than 67 percent. 
 
 
Figure 2. Domestic assets as a percentage of monetary base 
 
4.2. Domestic assets and total assets 
The second test (Figure 3, on the next page) examines what percentage 
domestic assets are of total assets. In an orthodox currency board, domestic 
assets will be 0 percent of total assets, or close. If a currency board holds 
domestic assets exceeding 10 percent of total assets, it is a sign of 
unorthodoxy. The rationale for avoiding domestic assets is that they are 
less liquid than top-quality foreign assets, and may only be saleable at a 
steep discount during a financial crisis.  Figure 3 shows the domestic assets 
as a percentage of total assets. Until the 1960s, rarely are the domestic assets 
greater than 10 percent. The average percentage of domestic assets divided 
by total assets over the 55-year period of the Fijian currency board was 6.85 
percent. The greatest value was in 1969 at 29.8 percent, but13 of the 14 
times the percentage was greater than 10 percent were during the 1950s 
and 1960s, again because of the policy change mentioned above. As with 
the first test, this test suggests that the currency board was orthodox for 
most of its life and unorthodox for a period near the end before veering 
back to orthodoxy shortly before the end of its existence. 
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Figure 3. Domestic assets as a percentage of total assets 
 
4.3. Reserve pass-through 
Another test of currency board orthodoxy concerns reserve pass-
through.  Reserve pass-through is the change in monetary base divided by 
the change in net foreign assets, and is calculated year-over-year.  With a 
perfectly orthodox currency board, reserve pass-through would be 100 
percent. Given that there is often difficulty in measuring reserve pass-
through precisely, because of such factors as changes in the market value of 
assets and the timing or expenses, Prof. Steve Hanke and Dr. Kurt Schuler 
have suggested that in practice a range from 80-120 percentshould be 
considered orthodox.  The reason reserve pass-through should be near 100 
percentis because changes in the monetary base should directly reflect the 
public’s purchases and the sale of foreign currency for domestic currency. 
Figure 4 shows the reserve pass-through for Fiji during its currency 
board period.  The ratio was highly volatile from start to finish.  With two 
exceptions, the data stayed between -300 percent and +300 percent, but was 
volatile between these marks. Figure 4 suggests that the Fijian Board of 
Commissioners of Currency was not orthodox by this measure, even for the 
period before the board began to hold substantial foreign assets. The 
average annual reserve pass-through for the whole era of available data 
was 70.0 percent. 
 
 
Figure 4. Reserve pass-through year-over-year percentage 
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Reserve pass-through measures changes. It can also be illuminating to 
look at the underlying figures from which the changes are measured.  
Figure 5 showsnet foreign assets and monetary base during the currency 
board period in Fiji. Although there were not many holes, years where data 
have not yet been found have been filled in with the previous year’s 
numbersfor the sake of continuity. The foreign assets and monetary base 
grew together at similar rates over the long run, which means the reserve 
pass-through figures are not as damaging to the case for orthodoxy as they 
might appear at first sight. Note that the amounts are expressed in Fijian 
dollars; Fijian pounds have been converted into Fijian dollars at £1 = $2 for 
continuity and ease of reading. 
 
 
Figure 5. Net foreign assets and monetary base 
 
4.4. Absolute change in net foreign assets and monetary base 
Test 4 compares absolute changes in net foreign assets and monetary 
base on a year-over-year basis.  A perfectly orthodox currency board would 
have changes in monetary base and net foreign assets follow a 1:1 ratio, or 
100 percent. Figure 6 shows the absolute change in foreign assets and 
monetary base year-over-year. As with figure 4, the data in figure 6is 
volatile. There was no easily detectable pattern between change in foreign 
assets and monetary base. Therefore, strictly based on test 4, it would be 
assumed the Board of Commissioners of Currency acted in an unorthodox 
manner. 
 
 
Figure 6. Total change of net foreign assets to total change of monetary base, year-over-year  
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4.5. Net worth residual as a percentage of total assets 
A final test to determine orthodoxy examines the net worth residual as a 
percentage of total assets.  Net worth is total assets minus total liabilities 
(excluding, of course, the net worth component that occurs on the liability 
side of a balance sheet).  A currency board is considered orthodox if this 
percentage is between 0-15 percent.  In principle, a currency board needs 
no net worth residual if its assets are perfectly safe, but in practice many 
currency boards have had net worth of around 10 percent of assets as a 
safeguard against the depreciation of the market value of their assets, 
particularly longer-term securities.  British colonial currency boards rarely 
or never had paid-in capital, so their net worth consisted of earnings not 
passed along to the government. Figure 7 shows that during Fiji’s currency 
board period, net worth was in the 0-15 percent range with just a few 
exceptions.  Net worth was below zero in 1931, when it fell to -1.5 percent 
on the devaluation of the pound sterling against gold.  The only other years 
it was negative were 1943 (-0.4 percent) and 1944 (-3.4 percent), when 
foreign assets did not grow as fast as the board’s liabilities; the reasons are 
not clear in the absence of a narrative account from the period. In 1933 the 
net worth of the currency board temporarily soared to 32.9 percent of total 
assets as a result of the devaluation of the Fijian pound, which raised the 
value in pounds of foreign assets.  By the following year net worth was just 
about 15 percent.  The overall impression from the net worth test is that in 
this respect, the currency board was orthodox. 
 
 
Figure 7. Net worth as a percentage of total assets 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our statistical analysis suggests that the Fijian Board of Commissioners 
of Currency acted in more of an orthodox manner than an unorthodox 
manner.  Test 1 indicates that with the exception of a few years in the 1960s, 
foreign assets as a percentage of monetary base were in the neighborhood 
of 100 percent.  Test 2 shows domestic assets to be less than 7 percent of 
total assets on average throughout the whole period, although significantly 
higher in the 1960s.  Test 3 shows a volatile and unorthodox reserve pass-
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through ratio.  However, reserve pass-through can be a ratio of small 
changes in large underlying magnitudes, namely the foreign assets and the 
monetary base. The underlying magnitudes grew in parallel, which is a 
sign of orthodoxy. Test 4 is the only test performed that indicates true 
unorthodoxy by the Fijian currency board.  The change in net foreign assets 
to change in monetary base was extremely volatile, and showed no 
tendency to home in on the 1:1 ratio of an orthodox currency board.  
Finally, test 5 indicated that the net worth residual was within the orthodox 
range of 0-15 percent for the whole period. 
There were two periods of unorthodoxy. As has been discussed, in the 
1930s the currency board switched anchor currencies and required 
payment for Fijian currency in gold even though it apparently did not pay 
gold when cashing Fijian currency. In the 1960s the board held significant 
domestic assets, but reversed this behavior before the end of its existence.   
On April 5, 1973, the Governor-General of Fiji approvedthe Central 
Monetary Authority Act to establish the Central Monetary Authority in 
place of the currency board.  This law provided for a Board of Members of 
six people including a chairman, a general manager, and several secretaries 
to be responsible for the Authority’s policies and affairs.  The government 
of Fiji replaced the currency board because it felt that the actions of the 
monetary authority should be self-starting and self-reversible. The board 
was simply a currency issuing and redeeming organization.  The main 
function of the new Central Monetary Authority was to expand upon the 
powers of the currency board and ensure the convertibility of the Fiji dollar 
to the then current laws relating to the control of foreign exchange.  In 
doing so, the Central Monetary Authority had much greater control over 
the creation of currency, coin, and bank deposits (Central Monetary 
Authority of Fiji 1974: 10-11).  The Central Monetary Authority, which had 
more discretionary monetary powers than the currency board but less than 
a typical central bank, in turn gave way to the Reserve Bank of Fiji, a full-
fledged central bank, in 1975. 
A rough gauge of the long-term record of the Reserve Bank of Fiji is the 
exchange rate between the Fijian dollar and the pound sterling, which was 
Fijian $1.98 = £1 sterling at the end of the currency board period. Today the 
exchange rate is approximately Fijian $2.86 = £1 sterling, a modest rate of 
depreciation over a 45-year span. Many countries that have replaced their 
currency boards with national central banks have performed orders of 
magnitude worse. 
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Note: Accompanying Data 
An accompanying spreadsheet workbook gives the data underlying this 
paper.  The main source of the data was the Fiji Royal Gazette, with some 
supplementation by the colonial annual report and the Blue Book (a 
standardized annual statistical summary issued by British colonies up to 
around the time of World War II).  The currency board issued abbreviated 
financial statements as of the tenth day of the month from 1914 or 1915 to 
1934.  It also issued fuller annual statements as of the end of December.  
From 1935 onward the currency board only released data semiannually.  
The workbook also includes some other data that may be useful to 
researchers, namely the annual balance sheet of the government and data 
on bank assets.  Some data are missing because of difficulty locating issues 
of the Fiji Royal Gazette.  The graphs and most of analysis in the paper are 
based on annual data, but the available higher-frequency data seem to 
support the conclusions arising from the annual data. 
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Appendix 
Relevant Fijian Legislation during the Currency Board Period 
A chronological summary of relevant legislation passed from 1913-1973 affecting 
currency in Fiji and the Fijian currency board. 
•Fiji, Government Currency Notes Ordinance, No. 30, 18 November 1913: Established 
the Board of Commissioners of Currency.  
•Fiji, Government Currency Notes Amendment Ordinance, No. 2, 14 February 1917: 
Allowed the currency board to invest in a wartime loan to the government of Fiji 
(apparently securities). 
•Fiji, Government Currency Notes Amendment Ordinance, No. 19, 20 December 1918: 
Allowed the British Secretary of State for the Colonies to approve reducing the coin reserve 
to as low as one-half of the notes in circulation, as opposed to one-half before (the rest of the 
reserve being held as securities). 
•Fiji, Government Currency Notes Amendment Ordinance, No. 23, 19 November 1920: 
Allowed the Commissioners of Currency to pay notes in silver coins permitted by the British 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
•Fiji, Ordinance No. 9 of 1921: Allowed the British Secretary of State for the Colonies to 
approve reducing the coin reserve to as low as one-fifth of the notes in circulation, as 
opposed to one-quarter before (the rest of the reserve being held as securities). 
•Fiji, Government Currency Notes Amendment Ordinance, No. 1, 1 June 1922: Allowed 
the government to suspend the convertibility of currency board notes into gold from time to 
time or to pay the notes in silver (such as British silver coins). 
•Fiji, Currency Notes (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 42, 13 December 1932: The currency 
board was allowed to issue notes against drafts on New Zealand currency for a temporary 
period of six months. 
•Fiji, Currency Notes Ordinance, No. 6, assented 25 July 1933, in force 1 November 1933: 
Put the currency on sterling exchange basis at Fijian £111 = UK£100 and ceased reference in 
the law to gold or silver coins. Increased the depreciation reserve from 10 percent to 20 
percent, high for a currency board. 
•Fiji, Coinage Ordinance, No. 1, 29 March 1934: Made the coinage the responsibility of 
the Commissioners of Currency and provided for establishing a Coinage Security Fund. 
•Fiji, Central Monetary Authority Act, No. 1 of 1973: Replaced the currency board with a 
quasi central bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics Library 
D. Tammaro, JEL, 7(1), 2020, p.39-53. 
53 
53 
References 
Boger, T. (2018). British imperialism and portfolio choice in the currency boards of Palestine, 
East Africa, and West Africa. Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences, 5(4), 296-308.  
Central Monetary Authority of Fiji. (1974). Report and Financial Statements. Parliament of 
Fiji, Parliamentary Paper, No.8. 
Digital Archive on Currency Boards. (2019). Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, 
and the Study of Business Enterprise, Johns Hopkins University. [Retrieved from].  
Fiji Annual Report. (1913-1970). Great Britain (United Kingdom). Colonial Office, Report 
for< (1913-1930); Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress 
of the People of Fiji (1931-1938); not published 1939-1946 because of World War II; 
Colonial Office, Annual Report on Fiji for the Year< (1947-1950), Colonial Office, Report 
on Fiji for the Year< (1951-1958); Colonial Office, Fiji: Report for the Year< (1959-1965); 
Commonwealth Office, Annual Report on Fiji for the Year< (1966-1967); Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Annual Report on Fiji for the Year< (1968-1970). London: His / 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 
Fiji Royal Gazette. (1875-1987) Suva. Contains the annual and higher-frequency financial 
statements of the Commissioners of Currency. 
Hanke, S.H. (2002). Currency boards. Annals, American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, no. 579. [Retrieved from]. 
Hanke, S.H. (2008). Why Argentina did not have a currency board. Central Banking, 18(3), 
55–58. 
Hanke, S.H., & Schuler, K. (2015). Currency Boards for Developing Countries: A Handbook. 
Original edition San Francisco: ICS Press, 1994.  
Johnston, D.M., & Reisman, W.M. (2008). The Historical Foundations of World Order: the Tower 
and the Arena. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Knapman, B. (1987). Fiji’s Economic History, 1874-1939: Studies of Capitalist Colonial 
Development. Canberra: Australian National University Press. 
Krus, N., & Schuler, K. (2014). Currency board financial statements. Institute for Applied 
Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise, Johns Hopkins 
University, Studies in Applied Economics, No.22. [Retrieved from]. 
Narsey, W. (1986). Fiji's colonial monetary system, export of colonial capital and colonial 
underdevelopment. Journal of Pacific Studies, 12, 87–161. 
Narsey, W. (2016). British Imperialism and the Making of Colonial Currency Systems. 
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Reserve Bank of Fiji. (1995a). Reserve Bank of Fiji (historical summary). [Retrieved from].  
Reserve Bank of Fiji. (1995b). History of Our Currency. Reserve Bank of Fiji. [Retrieved 
from]. 
Schuler, K. (2005). Ignorance and influence: U.S. economists on Argentina’s depression of 
1998–2002. Econ Journal Watch, 2(2), 234–278.  
Skully, M.T. (1987). Financial Institutions and Markets in the Southwest Pacific: a Study of 
Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Wilson, M. (2019). Reserve Bank of Fiji. Rbf.gov, Reserve Bank of Fiji. [Retrieved from]. 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
